Some Propositions on Intergenerational Risk Sharing, Social Security and Self-Insurance by Aoki, Takaaki
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Some Propositions on Intergenerational
Risk Sharing, Social Security and
Self-Insurance
Takaaki Aoki
State University of New York at Buffalo, Department of Economics
August 2006
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11684/
MPRA Paper No. 11684, posted 24 December 2008 08:40 UTC
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some Propositions on Intergenerational Risk Sharing, Social 
Security and Self-Insurance* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Takaaki Aoki** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
* JEL classification: A1, D0, D8, H0, J0. This paper is written by summarizing a part of results 
obtained in a series of my previous working papers: Aoki, Takaaki (2003) 
** State University of New York at Buffalo, Department of Economics, 415 Fronczak Hall, North 
Campus, Buffalo, NY 14260 USA  
Tel: (716)645-2121   E-mail: taoki@acsu.buffalo.edu    
 2 
Abstract 
This article describes, within a myopic intergenerational bargaining framework 
incorporating two discrete periods and binary states of risks, some new aspects regarding 
the mixture of intergenerational risk sharing and social security. Here, state-dependent 
utility under mortality risk proves to generate parents’ peculiar indifference curve regarding 
insurance contract, and self-insurance is shown to play a crucial role on the decision 
regarding social security holding and intergenerational transfer contract. This peculiar 
aspect, given for the first time in this article, also derives some novel features of insurance 
theory under lifetime uncertainty, where the current position in social security contract 
could adversely affect parents’ decision regarding intergenerational risk sharing with 
children. In addition, other basic results regarding the sensitivity to default risk and 
taxation in social security are summarized. 
  
1. Introduction 
The objective of this article is simply and clearly to describe some new economic aspects 
of intergenerational risk sharing under lifetime uncertainty within a myopic bargaining 
framework. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) are textbooks of 
public economics and international macroeconomics, especially the latter of which contains 
the description of a risk sharing with default risk and saving. Ehrlich and Becker (1972) 
develop a basic theory of demand for insurance that emphasizes the interaction between 
market insurance, “self-insurance” and “self-protection”. For some other examples among 
related literatures, Shiller (1999), Ball and Mankiw (2001), Enders and Lapan (1982) and 
Gordon and Varian (1988) examine the economic role of intergenerational risk sharing. 
Yaari (1965) is a classical article, which pursuits the implications of life insurance under the 
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mortality risk. Hayashi, Altonji and Kotlikoff (1996) is an empirical work on intra-gamily & 
inter-generational risk sharing accompanying the possibility of self-insurance. Analyses on 
bequest motives appear, among many, in Abel (1985, 1987), Hurd (1989), Bernheim, Shleifer 
and Summers (1985) and Bernheim (1991). 
 In this article we newly focus on a peculiar shape of parents’ indifference curve, which 
arises from a state dependent aspect of utility under a life uncertainty environment, using a 
model of two discrete periods and binary states of mortality/income risks. In section 2, a 
basic framework is set, in which two adjacent generations, parents in old adulthood and 
children in young adulthood are facing the decision regarding intergenerational risk sharing 
with/without an available old-age social security for parents. In section 3, some 
characteristics in parents’ difference curve are explained, where self-insurance plays an 
important role on the insurance contract decision. On the basis of these analyses, we claim 
some fundamental propositions regarding the optimal allocation of social security and 
intergenerational risk sharing in section 4, and some regarding the sensitivity to default 
risk and taxation in social security in section 5. 
 
2. Basic setting 
At first we divide each generation’s lifetime roughly into three stages, “Y ” (for the child), 
“ M ” (for the young adulthood) and “ O ” (for the old adulthood), each of which corresponds 
with each discrete period (≑30 years). Assume that, at the beginning of period t , two 
adjacent generations, “ p ” (parents) and “ c ” (children), are now going to begin stage O  
and M , respectively.1 2 Parents hold an available asset pA , and children’s disposable 
income is cW . During this period, there exist two types of binary risk, the risk of death 
                                                   
1 This is a typical overlapping generation model. 
2 These notations are also used in superscripts/subscripts. 
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(mortality risk )0,1(1 =s ) for parents, and that of disposable income )0,1(2 =s  for children. 
The risk of death exists is revealed exactly at the middle point of stage O , when they are 
alive )1( 1 =s with probabilityj , or die )0( 1 =s with probability j-1 . The income risk is 
revealed exactly at the middle point of stage M , when they earn the higher income cW1  
)1( 2 =s with probability 'j , or the lower income cW0  )0( 2 =s with '1 j- . Therefore, the 
revelation of mortality risk for parents, and that of income risk for children exactly coincide 
with each other in time. Each generation ),( cpi =  holds an egoistic utility, which depends 
explicitly only on its own consumption only during stage M  and O , not during Y , and 
takes a form of state-dependent utility: 
  )}()({)()(~ 21221 iOiiOiiMiiMii cucucucuu bbb +++=   if 11 =s   
)()()(~ 1221 iOiiMiiMii cucucuu bb ++=    if 01 =s   
)1/()( 1 ss -= -ccu i  if 1¹s , or ccu i ln)( = if 1=s    (2.1) 
Here b  is a constant time preference for each half period, s  is a constant relative risk 
aversion coefficient, iMc 1  is a real consumption of generation i  during the first half period 
of stage M , iOc 2  is a real consumption of generation i  during the second half period of 
stage O , or etc. Utility function )(×u  is increasing and concave, and assumes ordinary 
Inada conditions. The real interest rate for each half period is denoted by r .3  Children’s 
life strategies during stage M  (number of children to bear N , human capital investment 
for each child H , asset plan A ) are exogenously given, except for the intergenerational 
transfer contracts with parents ),( BS . For parents, there are two options of old adulthood 
insurance for mortality risk, intergenerational transfer with children ),( BS  and social 
                                                   
3 )1/(1 r+=b is assumed just for convenience but without loss of generality. 
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security ),( PR .4 5 If these transfer contracts are actuarially fair, they necessarily satisfy: 
   BSl )1(:1 jj -=  or PRl )1(:1 jj -=    (2.2) 
At first assume that 1s and 0s  are uncorrelated. Then the associated indirect utilities for 
parents and children regarding a transfer contract schedule ),( BS  are represented as: 
 )))(1(()(),,,,,(~ BSruBAuArBSv ppp +++-º jbbj     (2.4a)6 
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3. Some peculiar aspects of intergenerational risk sharing 
 See Figure 1. The dotted line a , c , and d  are the indifference curves of parents, 
which draws the contour lines ppp vArBSv =),,,,,(~ bj  for distinct constants, pv ’s. On 
the other hand, b , e , and f are those of children, which draws the contour lines 
ccc vWrBSv =),,,,,(~ bj  for distinct cv ’s. Under the settings of section 2, there exists a 
set of intergenerational transfer contract ),( BS , such that: (1) both parents and children are 
willing to conclude the contract. (Participation constraints), and (2) each contract is 
Pareto-optimum. (Pareto optimality conditions) Furthermore, the compact set denoted by 
pX , satisfying the above conditions (1) and (2), is located inside the area 0>S , 0>B  
                                                   
4 ),( BS and ),( PR  denote ),( BequestSupport  and ),(Re Paymentceipt , respectively. Here 
the left-hand side of ),( BS  and ),( PR denotes receipt with occurrence of 11 =s , and the 
right-hand side does payment with 01 =s , both sides measured by present value at the beginning of 
the period. 
5 In this article, we do not set any substantial distinction between social security and market 
insurance. 
6 If social security program ),( PR  is also available, then:  
)))(1(()(),,,,,(~ PBRSruPBAuArPBRSv ppp +++++--º++ jbbj  (2.4a’) 
7 Under no correlation between 1s and 0s , cW is defined as the expected disposable income, that 
is ccc WWW 01 )'1(' jj -+º . 
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and SB jj >- )1( . pX is a bold segment line GF , where point F  is a tangent point of 
parents’ indifference curve a , and that of children e , and point G  is a tangent point of 
children’s indifference curve b and that of parents d . Any indifference curves of parents 
( a , c  or d ) are shown to be tangent with two lines, pAB =  and certainty line 
SBl -=:2 . Children, if they do not conclude any transfer contract, will be undoubtedly at 
point O  (that is, )0,0(),( =BS ), being tangent with the actuarially fair line 
BSl )1(:1 jj -= . In general, as illustrated in the indifference curve f, any arbitrary 
indifference curve of children is tangent with the constant premium line 
kSBl =-- jj)1(:'1 , at the intersection of '1l  and SBl -=:2 .  
 See Figure 2. Now we examine parents’ position within a given transfer contract 
scheme ),( BS . If parents are not given any transfer contract, their position is illustrated as 
point ( ))1/()(,0),(: /1/1 bjbj ss += pABSD , where a  is tangent with the horizontal 
axis 0=S , exactly at point D .8  Here B  is not an amount of bequest, but is some 
conditional cost on death ( 01 =s ) to be additionally discarded as a result of partially 
self-insuring mortality risk 1s .9 Thus point D  is an optimal “self-insurance (self-contract)”, 
which parents would choose when the social security is not available. Instead, if parents 
make the actuarially fair and flexible social security contract, their position is 
point E : ( ))1/(),1/()1(),( jbjbjbbj ++-= pp AAPR , where their indifference curve c  
is tangent with PRl )1(:1 jj -= , at point E .10 See point I  and J , both located on 1l . 
I  is the point where a , which passes point D , intersects with 1l . Therefore, I  is a 
                                                   
8 In this case, parents’ maximization problem is equivalent with maximizing their indirect utility 
associated with the transfer contract ),( BS , (2.4a), with regard to B , keeping S  fixed at 0. 
9 This cost is paid along axis B .  
10 Note that parents’ maximization problem is equivalent with maximizing their associated indirect 
utility (2.4a), with regard to ),( BS  satisfying 1l . Here intergenerational transfer ),( BS is replaced 
with the notation for social security contract ),( PR . 
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reservation actuarially fair contract, which assures a minimum utility, same as an “optimal 
self-insuring contract” D . On the other hand, J  is a point on 1l , at which an indifference 
curve of parents takes a minimum in S  exactly at J . Now we consider some fixed 
actuarially fair contract on 1l , represented as point ),(: KK PRK .11 Assume that K  is 
located on between point O  and J . In this case, parents can be even better off than at K , 
by discarding some additional cost 'P  say, conditionally on death (along the axis in B ), as a 
kind of self-insuring contract. Let point 'K  be the tangent point of parents’ indifference 
curve and KRS = . Then the optimal additional cost 'P , which parents should discard 
conditionally on death, is calculated as distance 'KK . If K  is located in the upper-right of 
J along 1l , then parents do not have to pay any additional cost along in B . The overall 
locus of a mixed contract schedule K~  say, which should include that additional and 
conditional cost in correspondence with each given contract K , would be a semi-segment of 
line, DJEQ , as drawn in a bold line in Figure 1.12 we denote this set, which can be 
optimally attained as a result of making use only of an actuarially fair contract set, 
by acX .13  
 Without any contracts concluded, parents would stand at point D , while children 
would at a different pointO . This aspect makes it for both parents and children impossible 
to set initially some value for the state contingent claim between two states of 1s , or 
equivalently to set the initial relative price between S  and B . This is a totally different 
point from Arrow-Debreu state-contingent exchange economy, in which state contingent 
claim (or state price) enables them to arrive at a market-clearing and Pareto optimal 
                                                   
11 0,0 ³³ KK PR . 
12 Point Q  on 1l  is infinitely far in the upper-right side.   
13 Clearly K~  coincides with 'K  if K  is located on a segment line OJ , and coincides with K  
itself if K  is on a semi-segment line JQ . 
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equilibrium. 14  Therefore, in this myopic bargaining frame work, an automatic price 
adjustment process to a unique equilibrium point on pX  cannot be expected, as far as any 
additional restriction (e.g., regarding the altruistic weight in utility between parents and 
children) or any other peculiar agreements or algorithms are not introduced.15 This is one 
important economic feature of intergenerational contract curve pX . On the other hand, 
with a fixed level of available social security, for example JK = , in which self-insurance is 
not necessary, Arrow-Debreu state-contingent exchange economy can be well defined. In this 
case, an equilibrium (Pareto optimal and market clearing) contract does not depend on the 
existence of altruism between parents and children, since, in general, the weight of altruism 
does not transform the shape of extended contract curve, which is drawn just by relaxing 
participation constraints.16 
 
4. Some propositions regarding the mixture of intergenerational risk sharing and social 
security 
 Now we compare, within the current framework, actuarially fair social security and 
intergenerational transfer contract, from parents’ viewpoint. Especially one important 
question is: Do parents choose only an actuarially fair social security or only an 
intergenerational transfer contract with children, or both of them? Although it depends on 
where an available social security K  and an available intergenerational transfer Y  are 
                                                   
14  If both parents and children agree with standing initially at point O , there does exist a 
competitive equilibrium on pX  ( GF ). 
15 One example is one-sided (or two-sided) altruistic utility of the form )~(~ cpp uuU y+= . 
16 With a fixed social security ),( KK PR , this extended contract curve (not pX ) is drawn by a set of 
points, where parents’ indifference curve is tangent with the curve generated by shifting children’s 
indifference curve in parallel along with 1l  by vector ),( KK PR .   
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located on 1l  and on pX  respectively, some aspects regarding this question can be 
extracted, by setting one simple assumption regarding children’s behavior, that they would 
accept any intergenerational transfer which is offered from parents, if it assures at least the 
same utility as at point Y  in terms of children’s associated indirect utility (2.4b).17 Denote 
parents’ maximized utilities, which can be attained by concluding only social security K , 
only intergenerational transferY , both of them, by )(KV p , )(YV p  and )( YKV p + , 
respectively.18 At first, we claim a following proposition and corollary. 
Proposition 1: See Figure 2. Then: 
(i) Assume that Y  coincides with G , the point which attains parents’ maximum utility on 
pX . Then, for any arbitrary K , which is located on the segment line of 1l , OZ , it holds 
that )()( YKVYV pp +£  and )()( YKVKV pp +£ . 
(ii) Assume that Y  coincides with F , the point which attains parents’ minimum utility on 
pX . Then, for any arbitrary K  on 1l  such that '''ZOOK £ , it holds that 
)()( YKVYV pp +£  and )()( YKVKV pp +³ . 
Corollary 1:  Consider an already concluded (mandatory) intergenerational transfer Y  
on pX . Then, any arbitrary social security K  on 1l  ( 0,0 ³³ BS ) surely enhances 
parents’ indirect utility without any necessity to discard any additional and conditional cost, 
if K  is not extremely large in amount. This always holds whether there exists some 
correlation between parents’ state 1s  and children’s state 2s  or not. 
 
                                                   
17 Therefore we assume implicitly that children do not enter any other transfer contract including 
social security. 
18 With each of these three options, parents may pay, if necessary, an additional and conditional cost 
along the axis in B (self-insurance), as explained in Section 3. For rigorous formulation of parents’ 
problems to be solved, see Appendix. 
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Corollary 1 is clear from children’s indifference curve under positive/negative correlation 
between 1s  and 2s , as shown in Figure 3 and 4. Proposition 1 has quite interesting 
economic implications. First, parents, together with a mandatory intergenerational transfer, 
would almost always choose to take any arbitrarily given social security. Second, but if 
reversely any social security is mandatory, while a fixed intergenerational transfer is not, it 
may not be the case. If a non-mandatory intergenerational transfer Y  coincides with G , 
the maximum utility point, parents are very likely to take both of any arbitrary K  and the 
intergenerational transfer Y (= G) , on the other hand, if a non-mandatory 
intergenerational transfer Y coincides with F , the minimum utility point, parents are 
very likely to take only social security for any arbitrary K . This implies that it is quite 
natural to think that for any arbitrary, but mandatory K , which is not extremely large in 
amount, there exists some point Y  on pX , such that parents are indifferent to whether to 
accept an intergenerational contract or not. From continuity and monotonicity of parents’ 
indirect utilities on pX , we have a proposition and a corollary as follows. 
Proposition 2: See Figure 2. For any arbitrary social security K , which is located on 1l , such 
that '''ZOOK £ , there always exists at least one intergenerational transfer, )(KY  as a 
function of K  on pX , such that V p (K) = V p (K + Y (K)) .  
Corollary 2: Assume )(KY  is not point G . Then )(KY  moves slightly along pX ( GF ) 
in the direction to G , for a slight positive change in K . 
 
Just for purely mathematical interest, we claim following two lemmas. 
Lemma 1: pX  (A segment line GF ) has a negative tangent slope (of R  with regard to 
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P ), which is less than -1. Also, a segment line JD , which is a part of acX , has a negative 
tangent slope (of R  with regard to P ), which is less than -1. 
Lemma 2: Denote a tangent point of parents’ indifference curve with a constant premium 
line, kRPl =--= jj)1('1 , by point kE . (So, 0=kE  is the same point as E .) Then the 
locus of the set of point kE , has a negative tangent slope (of R  with regard to P ), which 
is less than -1. 
 
The proof of next Proposition is directly derived from Lemma 2. 
Proposition 3: Assume an already concluded (mandatory) intergenerational transfer Y  on 
pX , and a flexible, actuarially fair social security K  on 1l . Then the optimal social 
security )(ˆ YK  as a function of Y , which gives the maximum of parents’ indirect utility 
))(ˆ( YYKV p + , decreases in its size KO ˆ , as Y  moves along pX  from G  to F . 
 Lastly we examine the simplest case in which only actuarially fair social security K  
on 1l  is available for parents. Assume that only actuarially fair social security K  on 1l  is 
available for parents. Then, as K  moves along 1l  from O  to Q , that is, as ˜ K  moves 
along X ac   ( DJEQ ), parents' marginal utility of social security decreases. Especially at 
point J  the marginal utility discontinuously jumps into a lower level, and it becomes 0 
(zero) at point E . This aspect shows that if social security is some point between O  and J , 
the marginal utility (benefit) of social security is relatively high because of the decreasing 
cost of self-insurance. Together with intergenerational transfer, however, this kind of 
discontinuity does not appear.  
 
5. Other results regarding the sensitivity to default risk and taxation in social security  
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 In this section we limit our analysis only on social security, and examine the sensitivity 
both of parents and children to default risk and taxation on the demand for social security, 
wherein now children’s income risk 2s  arises and cc WW 01 > .19   
Sensitivity to default risk 
 We introduce another risk 3s  for the default risk of social security system, where 
13 =s  represents non-default and 03 =s  represents default. Also assume that the 
probability of default ( 03 =s ) is h , and 3s  has no correlation with 1s  and 2s , 
respectively.20 At first, consider the demand for social security by parents during stage O , 
)),()(,( PRPR pp = . The pay off of parents for each realization of two relevant risks, 1s  
and 3s , is as following. Parents receive R  for }1,1{ 31 == ss  with probability )1( hj - , 
P-  for }1,0{ 31 == ss  with )1)(1( hj -- , )(0 zero  for }0,1{ 31 == ss with jh , P-  
for }0,0{ 31 == ss  with hj)1( - , respectively. In case of “default”, parents still have a 
liability ( P ), if they die (that is, if }0,0{ 31 == ss  occurs). Now we have two definitions for 
actuarially fair condition: Conditional actuarially fair condition on non-default, 
PRl )1(:1 jj -=  (5.1), and unconditional actuarially fair condition, 
PRl )1()1(:1 jhjh -=- (5.2). Furthermore, parents’ associated indirect utility including 
default risk is re-defined as:21 
))1(()))(1(()1()(),,,,,,(~~ PruPRruPAuArPRv ppp ++++-+-º jhbbhjbhj  (5.3) 
Now we examine the sensitivity of parents’ demand for an actuarially fair social security in 
the sense of (5.1) and (5.2), when h  deviates slightly from 0 (zero) by a positive bit. In 
particular, our interest is in the sensitivity of an optimal contract E  and a reservation 
                                                   
19 Therefore condition (iv) of (2.4) has been relaxed. 
20 It seems appropriate to assume that there exists no correlation among 1s , 2s  and 3s , so far as 
there does not occur any strong social systemic risk. Otherwise, these three risks may have a 
considerable strong positive correlation with each other. 
21 (5.3) is a modified version of (2.4a). 
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contract I , to h . In order to do this, we denote the tangent point of either 1l  or h1l  with 
the indifference curve based on this “modified” associated indirect utility (5.3), 
by ))(),((: hhh EE PRE .22 Also, we denote the point on either 1l  or h1l , which, with the 
indifference curve based on a modified associated indirect utility, (5.3), attains the same 
utility as at point D  of 0=h  ( 0=hD , say), by ))(),((: hhh II PRI .23 Now we claim a 
following proposition. 
Proposition 4: (Parents’ demand sensitivity to default risk) Assume that social security has 
default risk with conditional actuarially fair condition (5.1). Then we have: (i) 
0)(',0)(' >> hh EE PR  if 1>s , 0)(',0)(' == hh EE PR  if 1=s , and 
0)(',0)(' << hh EE PR  if 1<s . Furthermore we have: (ii) 0)0(',0)0(' >> II PR , 
irrespective of the value of s . 
Instead of (5.1), assume that social security has default risk with unconditional actuarially 
fair condition (5.2). Then it always holds that: (iii) 0)(',0)(' >> hh EE PR , and (iv) 
0)0(',0)0(' >> II PR , irrespective of the value of s . 
 
 Next consider the optimal demand for social security by children during stage M , 
)),()(,( PRPR cc = . The pay off of children for each realization of two relevant risks, 2s  
and 3s , is as following. Children receive P-  for )1,1( 32 == ss  with probability )1(' hj - , 
R  for }1,0{ 32 == ss  with )1)('1( hj -- , P-  for }0,1{ 32 == ss with hj ' , )(0 zero  
for }0,0{ 32 == ss  with hj )'1( - , respectively. In case of “default”, children still have a 
liability ( P ), if they have a higher income (that is, if }0,1{ 32 == ss  occurs). Now we have 
two definitions for actuarially fair condition: Conditional actuarially fair condition on 
                                                   
22 ))0(),0((:0 EE PRE =h coincides with point ),(: EE BSE .  
23 hI  is the point, which, with the default risk, assures the same minimum utility as when no social 
security is available. ))0(),0((:0 II PRI =h coincides with point ),(: II BSI .  
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non-default, RPl )'1(':3 jj -=  (5.4), and unconditional actuarially fair condition, 
RPl )1)('1(':3 hjjh --=  (5.5). Furthermore, children’s “modified” associated indirect 
utility including default risk is defined as: 24 
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         (5.6) 
Now we examine the sensitivity of children’s optimal demand for an actuarially fair social 
security ))(),(( hh cc PR under (5.4) and (5.5) to h , when h  deviates slightly from 0 by a 
positive bit. Then: 
Proposition 5: (Children’s demand sensitivity to default risk) Assume that social security has 
default risk with conditional actuarially fair condition (5.4). Then (i) 0)0(',0)0(' << cc PR . 
Instead of (5.4), assume that social security has default risk with unconditional actuarially 
fair condition (5.5). Then (ii) 0)0(',0)0(' <> cc PR . 
 
In either case of (5.4) or (5.5), )(')0( 01 ccc WWR -= j and ))('1()0( 01 ccc WWP --= j , 
where children fully insure their income risk. 
Sensitivity to taxation 
 We turn our focus to taxation on social security both for parents and children. Consider 
two kinds of tax: a lump-sum actuarially fair tax, and an exercise tax only on payment P . 
Let RT  and PT  be conditional taxes imposed on the realization of receipt R  and payment 
P , respectively. Lump-sum actuarially fair tax is described as ),( PR TT , where 
PR TT )1( jj -=  for parents and PR TT ')'1( jj =-  for children, (5.7). An exercise tax on 
                                                   
24 (5.6) is a modified version of (2.4b). 
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payment P , is described as ),0(),( pPR TTT = , where PTP z= , and we assume 
tax-deducted actuarially fair conditions, PR )1)(1( zjj --=  (5.8) for parents, 
PR )1(')'1( zjj -=-  (5.9) for children. z  is defined as a proportional tax rate on P . 
The expected tax income by the government is, RP TTET jj --º )1(  (5.10) for parents, 
and RP TTET )'1(' jj --º  (5.11) for children. The associated indirect utilities with 
regard to ),( PR , remain almost the same as (2.4a) for parents, and (2.4b) for children: 
 )))(1(()(),,,,,(~ PRruPAuArPRv ppp +++-º jbbj   (2.4a’’) 
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 Clearly a lump-sum actuarially fair tax is better than an exercise tax on payment P , for 
both parents and children, in the sense that, keeping the expected tax income ET  at 
constant, a lump-sum actuarially fair tax could always attain better associated indirect 
utility with regard to ),( PR , than an exercise tax only on payment P . 
 We proceed to the sensitivity analysis to an exercise taxation on payment P , as 
described in (5.8) for parents and (5.9) for children. (5.8) and (5.9) are, in a sense, equivalent 
with unconditional actuarially fair conditions incorporating default risk, (5.2) for parents 
and (5.5) for children, respectively, if we set 1)1)(1( =-- zh . Here, we can interpret h  as 
a conditional profit margin or a subsidy margin on the realization of receipt R . Denote 
parents’ optimal demand for social security with the condition (5.8) by ))(~),(~( zz pp PR , 
and children’s optimal demand for social security with the condition (5.9) by 
))(~),(~( zz cc PR , respectively. Then: 
Proposition 6: (Parents’ demand sensitivity to taxation) Assume that the government 
imposes an exercise tax on payment P , for parents’ social security, with tax-deducted 
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actuarially fair condition (5.8). Then (i) 0)('~ <zpR , irrespective of the value of s . 
Furthermore (ii) 0)('~ >zpP  if 1>s , 0)('~ =zpP  if 1=s , and 0)('~ <zpP  if 1<s .  
Proposition 7: (Children’s demand sensitivity to taxation) Assume that the government 
imposes an exercise tax on payment P  for children’s social security, with tax-deducted 
actuarially fair condition (5.9). Then (i) 0)0('~ <cR , irrespective of the value of s . 
 
6. Final remarks 
In a continuous-time case, parents’ problem to be solved can be represented as follows: 
Define parents’ transfer contract incorporating the risk of death ))(),(( tBtS  for Tt ££0 . 
T (≑30 years) is the length of stage O , and ))(),(( tBtS  is measured as a present value at 
time 0, not t , and )(tB  is continuously differentiable for all Tt ££0 . Also let )(tc  be 
their consumption plan at time t, measured as a present value at time t , and pA  be the 
present value of total available wealth, measured at time 0. Define the probability that 
parents are alive at time t, as )(tj , where 1)0( =j , and 0)( =Tj . Then the budget 
(feasibility) constraint is written as: 
 )('})'exp()'()'({
0
tBAdtrttctS pt -=-+-ò  for all Tt ££0 . (6.1) 
Equivalently in a differential form: )exp()]()('[)( rttStBtc +-=  for all Tt ££0 (6.1’)  
From (6.1), we have pAB =)0( , and 0)( =TB . An actuarially fair condition of the transfer 
contract ))(),(( tBtS is: òò -= TT dtttBdttSt 00 )(')()()( jj   (6.2) 
Here dttStS Tòº 0 )()(~ j  is an expected support and ò-º T dtttBB 0 )(')(~ j  is an expected 
bequest. In a differential form, )(')()()( ttBtSt jj -=  (6.2’). This is a continuous-time 
version of an actuarially fair condition in a two-period case, BSl )1(:1 jj -= . Assume that 
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parents’ transfer schedule ))(),(( tBtS is predetermined. Then they solve: (X) 
dtttcutT
tc ò -0)( )exp())(()(max bj  (6.3) s.t. (6.1’). However, as a matter of fact the 
maximization problem is not left for parents, but their consumption is automatically 
determined at )exp()]()('[)( rttStBtc +-=  for all Tt ££0  (6.1’). Therefore, as in a 
two-period case, there exists some possibility of self-insurance, in which parents must pay 
an additional cost conditionally on death. On the other hand, children’s indirect utility at 
time t  with transfer contract ))(),(( tBtS ( Tt ££0 ) proves to have an indifference curve, 
which is tangent with a continuous-time actuarially fair line )(')()()( ttBtSt jj -=  (6.2’). 
From all the above points, our analysis made in the previous 4 sections with two discrete 
periods does not lose any generality even in a continuous-time case. 
 Thus this article has just summarized, using a simple model of two discrete periods 
and binary states of mortality/income risks, some fundamental propositions regarding the 
mixture of intergenerational risk sharing and social security. Here for the first time, 
state-dependent utility under mortality risk proves to generate parents’ peculiar 
indifference curve regarding insurance contract, and self-insurance is shown to play a 
crucial role on the decision regarding social security holding and intergenerational transfer 
contract. 
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Appendix 
Rigorous definitions of  )(KV P , )(YV P  and )( YKV P +  
Define an actuarially fair social security ),(: KK PRK , where K  is on 
KK PRl )1(:1 jj -= , and an intergenerational transfer ),(: YY BSY  on PX .  Then: 
 ),,,,',(~max)(
0'
p
KK
p
P
p ArPPRvKV bj+º
³
   (A1.1-1) 25 
 ),,,,,(~)( pYYpp ArBSvYV bjº     (A1.1-2) 
 ),,,,',(~max)(
0'),,(
p
KK
p
PBS
p ArPBPSRvYKV bj+++º+
³
 (A1.1-3) 26 
  s.t. ))(,,,,,(~),,,,,(~ ccYYccc vWrBSvWrBSv º= bjbj   
    and KK PRl )1(:1 jj -=  
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
See Figure 2. Graphically )(KV P  can be determined as parents’ indirect utility of the 
point, where a horizontal line KRR = , crosses acX  (that is, parents’ indifference curve is 
tangent with a horizontal line KRR =  clearly on acX ), )(YV P  simply as that of point Y  
on PX , and )( YKV P +  as that of the point where parents’ indifference curve is tangent 
with the curve generated by shifting children’s indifference curve in parallel along with 1l  
by vector ),( KK PR .   
(i) (Case: GY = ) Let Z  be the point where children’s “shifted” indifference curve, which is 
tangent both with parents’ indifference curve d , and an actuarially fair line 1l , is tangent 
                                                   
25 (A1.1-1) can be rewritten as: 
 ),,,,,(~max)(
,
pp
PPRR
p ArPRvKV
KK
bj
³=
º    (A1.1-1’) 
26 (A1.1-3) can be rewritten as: 
  ),,,,',(~max)(
0'),,(
pp
PPR
p ArPPRvYKV bj+º+
³
  (A1.1-3’) 
  s.t. ))(,,,,,(~),,,,,(~ ccYYccKKc vWrBSvWrPPRRv º=-- bjbj   
    and KK PRl )1(:1 jj -=  
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with 1l . For some social security K , children’s shifted indifference curve is denoted by 'b  
for the original indifference curve b . Graphically it is clear that for any arbitrary K  on 1l  
such that OZOK £ , parents’ indifference curve, which is tangent with children’s shifted 
indifference curve 'b , is located in the upper side of both point K  and indifference curve 
d (or point G ). So, we have ))(())(( GYKVGYV pp =+£=  with equality when ZK = , 
and ))(()( GYKVKV pp =+£  with equality when EK = . 
(ii) (Case: FY = ) Denote the point where children’s indifference curve e  crosses the 
certainty line PRl -=:2 , by 'O . Also denote some constant premium line, which 
passes 'O , by ')1(:"1 kRPl =-- jj . (So, e  is tangent with parents’ indifference curve a  
at point F , and also is tangent with "1l  at point 'O .) "Z  is the point where children’s 
shifted indifference curve, which is tangent with both parents’ indifference curve a  and a 
constant premium line "1l , is tangent with "1l . For some social security K , denote 
children’s shifted indifference curve, which corresponds with original indifference curve e , 
by 'e . Graphically it is clear that for any arbitrary K  on 1l , such that "'ZOOK £ , that 
parents’ indifference curve, which is tangent with children’s shifted indifference curve 'e , is 
located in the upper side of parents’ indifference curve a (or point F ). So we have 
))(())(( FYKVFYV pp =+£=  with equality when "'ZOOK = . Now we proceed to the 
proof of ))(()( FYKVKV pp =+³ . For later convenience, we rewrite )(KV p  and 
)( YKV p +  as )( Kp RV  and ),( YRV Kp  using the amount of receipt for social 
security K , KR . Clearly, when OK =  (zero receipt, zero payment), we have 
))(),0(())0(( FYRVRV KpKp ==== , 27  because parents are indifferent between D  
and F . So, at first we show that, 
                                                   
27 That is, ))()(())(( FYOKVOKV pp =+=== . 
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  ))(),0(())0(( FYRVRRVR K
p
K
K
p
K
==¶
¶>=¶
¶ ,  (A1.2) 
and next show that ))(,( FYRV Kp =  can never catch and overpass )( Kp RV  for any 
arbitrary K  such that "'ZOOK £ .  
First step: Since, given an intergenerational transferY , parents need not pay an additional 
cost on death (i.e., one constraint 0'³P  is binding.), we can rewrite (A1.1-3) as:  
 ),,(~max),(
),(
PRvYRV p
PRK
p º     (A1.3) 
  s.t. ))(,,(~),,(~ cYYcKKc vBSvPPRRv º=--     
   and KK PRl )1(:1 jj -=  
Here ),( PR  denotes a “mixed” transfer contract schedule. Plugging the second equation of 
constraints into other equations of (A1.3), we have a following Lagrangian and 
corresponding first order conditions. 
 
0),1,(
~),,(~
0),1,(
~),,(~
),1,(
~),,(~
=---¶
¶-¶
¶
=---¶
¶-¶
¶
÷÷ø
öççè
æ -----=



KK
cp
KK
cp
c
KK
cp
RPRRvPPRvP
RPRRvRPRvR
vRPRRvPRvL
j
jl
j
jl
j
jl
 (A1.4) 
From the envelope theorem, also using (A1.3), we obtain: 
),(),,(~1),,(
~
),1,(
~
1),1,(
~
),(),('
PRPRvPPRvR
RPRRvPRPRRvR
YRVRYRV
PP
KK
c
KK
c
K
p
K
K
p
Xº¶
¶
-+¶
¶=
÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
---¶
¶
-+---¶
¶=
¶
¶º


j
j
j
j
j
j
j
jl  (A1.5) 
Similarly we obtain the following equation quite easily: 
  
),,(~
)()('
PRvR
RVRRV
P
K
p
K
K
p
¶
¶=
¶
¶º
     (A1.6) 
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Denote the point at which parents indifference curve, which crosses a solution point of (A1.3), 
),(: WWW PR  say, intersects with acX , by ),(: acac PRac WWW . Clearly, at any arbitrary point 
on acX , we have 0),,(~ =¶
¶ PRvP
P , so (A1.5) and (A1.6) actually share the same value at 
W  and Wac , that is ),( PRX . Now we have only to show that ),( PRX  is decreasing as 
P  increases (moves) along parents' indifference curve from acW  to W . 
Here, denote parents’ indifference curve, which passes acW  and W , by g . Remember 
parents’ indirect utility: 
 )))(1(()(),,,,,(~ PRruPAuArPRv ppp +++-º jbbj    (2.4a) 
It follows directly that:28 
0),,(~
0),,(~),,(~
2
2
2
2
2
<¶
¶
<¶¶
¶=¶
¶


PRvP
PRvRPPRvR
P
PP
   (A1.7)  
From the definition, we also have; 
 ),,(~1),,(
~),(  PRvPPRvRPR
PP
¶
¶
-+¶
¶ºX j
j   (A1.8) 
So, from (A1.7) and (A1.8), it follows that:  
 
0),,(~1),,(
~),(
0),,(~1),,(
~),(
2
22
2
2
2
<¶
¶
-+¶¶
¶ºX¶
¶
<¶¶
¶
-+¶
¶ºX¶
¶


PRvPPRvRPPRP
PRvRPPRvRPRR
PP
PP
j
j
j
j
 (A1.9) 
 0|*>dP
dR  (As graphically clear, P  increases (moves) along parents indifference curve 
from acW  to W , R  also increases.) 
                                                   
28 For the first order condition, we have 0),,(~ >¶
¶ PRvR
P . Furthermore, if P  is located in the 
right side of DJ on acX ), then 0),,(~ <¶
¶ PRvP
P . 
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 where * denotes that ),( PR  is on pp
ac
vPRvg WW= ,),,(~:  , say. 
Now, since ),(|),(|),( ** PRPdP
dRPRRPRdP
d X¶
¶+X¶
¶=X ,  (A1.10) 
and also 0>dP , from (A1.9) and (A1.10) we get 0|),( * <X PRdP
d  (A1.11). If F=W , 
clearly Dac =W , so we have completed the first step, that is, have proved (A1.2). 
Second step: Assume that for some ),(: KK PRK , we have ))(()( FYKVKV pp =+= , in 
another expression, ))(,()( FYRVRV KpKp == . For this K , denote solution points (of 
mixed contract schedule ),( PR ) for (A1.1-3’) and (A1.3), by W  again, and ),(: SSS PR , 
respectively. W  and S  attain the same indirect utility for parents, so S  should coincide 
with acW  in the above notation. Then we can use the same inequality (A1.11), in order to 
prove: 
 ))(),(())(( FYRRVRRRRVR K
p
K
K
p
K
ac
==¶
¶>==¶
¶
WWS   (A1.12) 
From the continuity of )( Kp RV  and ))(,( FYRV Kp =  with regard to KR , now we have 
just proved ))(,()( FYRVRV KpKp =³ , that is, ))(()( FYKVKV pp =+³  for any 
arbitrary K  such that "'ZOOK £ . 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
Graphically it is clear that, for any points on a segment line JD  of acX , which is the 
subset of solution points for (A1.1-1), one constraint 0'³P  is not binding. So, from the first 
order condition, we have a following equality: 
 ¶˜ v 
p
¶P = -u' (A
p - P) + jb(1 + r)u' (1 + r)(RK + P)( )= 0    (A2.1) 
Taking R  as a function of P , and differentiate (A2.1) with regard to P , we obtain: 
 u"(A p - P) + jb(1+ r )2 u" (1 + r)(RK + P)( ) dRKdP + 1æ è ö ø = 0   (A2.2) 
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Considering 0"<u , it follows directly that dRKdP < -1 (A2.3). 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
 Plugging the constant premium condition kRPl =--= jj)1('1  (A2.4) into (2.4a), 
we obtain the first order condition: 
 0)1(')1()(' =÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
÷÷ø
öççè
æ -+++-- jb
kPrurPAu p     (A2.5) 
Taking P  as a function of k , and differentiate (A2.4) with regard to k , we obtain; 
 01)1(")1()("
2
=÷ø
öçè
æ -÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
÷÷ø
öççè
æ -+++- dk
dPkPrurdk
dPPAu p jj
b  ,  (A2.6) 
from which it follows that 10 << dk
dP  or 1>dP
dk .  Since, from (A2.4); 
 dP
dk
dP
dR
jj
j 11 --= ,       (A2.7) 
we have 1-<dP
dR . Now the proof is done. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4:  
Proof of (i): Parents’ associated indirect utility including default risk is given in (5.3). 
Maximizing (5.3) subject to (5.1) with regard to P  (and implicitly R ), we have the first 
order condition for point hE : 
 0))1((')1()/)1((')1()1()(' =+++++-+-- PrurPrurPAu p jhbjbh  (A3.1) 
Replacing P  with )(hP  as a function of h  in (A3.1), differentiating the equality with 
regard to h , and implementing the comparative statics immediately produces the following 
equation: 
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))]()1((')/)()1((')[1(
))}()1(('')1(
)/)()1(('']/)1()1[())((''){('
2
2
hjjhb
hjhb
jhjbhhh
PruPrur
Prur
PrurPAuP p
+-++=
+++
++-+-
 (A3.2) 
The coefficient of )(' hP  in L.H.S, 
))}()1(('')1()/)()1(('']/)1()1[())((''{ 22 hjhbjhjbhh PrurPrurPAu p +++++-+- , 
is clearly negative since 0'' <u . The sign of R.H.S is negative, zero and positive, 
corresponding to 1>s , 1=s  and 1<s , respectively. Replacing )(hP  with )(hEP , we 
have completed the proof. 
Proof of (iii): The proof is almost the same as proof of (i) except for maximizing (5.3) subject 
to (5.2) instead of (5.1). The first order condition for point hE  is: 
( )
0))()1((')1(
))1(/()]1()1)[(()1(')]1()1)[(1())(('
=+++
--+-+-+-++--
hjhb
hjhjjhhjjbh
Prur
PrurPAu p   
         (A3.3) 
We get a following equation for comparative statics: 
( )
))}()1(('')1(
))1(/()]1()1)[(()1('')))1(/()]1()1([()1(
))((''){('
2
22
hjhb
hjhjjhhjhjjb
hh
Prur
Prur
PAuP p
+++
--+-+--+-++
-
( )
))()1((')1(
))1(/()]1()1)[(()1('')))1(/()1)]((1()1[()1( 22
hjb
hjhjjhhjjhjjb
Prur
Prur
++-
--+-+---+-+=
         (A3.4) 
Considering 0'>u , 0'' <u , clearly, R.H.S is negative, and the coefficient of )(' hP  in 
L.H.S, 
( )
))}()1(('')1(
))1(/()]1()1)[(()1(''))]1(/()]1()1[()1(
))((''{
2
22
hjhb
hjhjjhhjhjjb
h
Prur
Prur
PAu p
+++
--+-+--+-++
-
 
is also negative. So, replacing )(hP  with )(hEP , the proof is done. 
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Proof of (ii): Since (5.3) must be constant subject to (5.1), we have: 
.))()1(()/)()1(()1())(( ConstPruPruPAu p =+++-+- hjhbjhbhjh over h  
The first order condition with regard to h  produces:  
 
0))]()1(()/)()1(([
))}()1((')1(
)/)()1((')1()1())(('){('
>+-+=
+++
++-+--
hjhjb
hjhb
jhbhhh
PruPru
Prur
PrurPAuP p
 (A3.5) 
Evaluating (A3.5) at 0=h , 
   0)}/)0()1((')1())0(('){0(' >+++-- jb PrurPAuP p   (A3.6) 
So, we need the sign of the coefficient of )0('P  in L.H.S, 
 )}/)0()1((')1())0(('{ jb PrurPAu p +++-- .   (A3.7) 
But, this is exactly the first order condition at )(0 EE ==h , which should be 0 at E . Since 
)(0 II ==h  is located in the left-down side of E  along 1l , so (A3.7) should have a positive 
value. The proof is now done. 
Proof of (iv): Since (5.3) must be constant subject to (5.2), we have: 
 ( ).))()1((
))1(/()]1()1)[(()1()1())((
ConstPru
PruPAu p
=++
--+-+-+-
hjhb
hjbhjjhbhjh  
 over h .         (A3.8) 
Differentiating (A3.8) with regard to h  produces:  
 
( )
( )
( ) )())1(/()]1()1)[(()1(')1/()1)(1(
))]()1(())1(/()]1()1)[(()1([
))}()1((')1(
))1(/()]1()1)[(()1(')]1()1)[(1(
))(('){('
hhjhjjhhjb
hhjhjjhjb
hjhb
hjhjjhhjjb
hh
PPrur
PruPru
Prur
Prur
PAuP p
--+-+--++
+---+-+=
+++
--+-+-+-++
--
 (A3.9) 
Evaluating (A3.9) at 0=h , 
   
0
)0()/)0()1((')1)(1(
))]0()1(()/)0()1(([
)}/)0()1((')1())0(('){0('
>
+-++
+-+=
+++--
PPrur
PruPru
PrurPAuP p
jjb
jjb
jb
   (A3.10) 
Now we have only to examine the sign of the coefficient of )0('P  in L.H.S; 
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)}/)0()1((')1())0(('{ jb PrurPAu p +++-- , which is exactly the same as (A3.7). Since 
1
0
1 ll ==h , we can apply the same argument as after (A3.7) in the proof of (ii). The proof is 
now done. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
Proof of (i): Children’s associated indirect utility including default risk is given in (5.6). 
Maximizing (5.6) subject to (5.4) with regard to R  (and implicitly P ) and 1c , we have the 
first order condition, with regard to R , for some value of 1c  such that 
),,,,',,(~~maxargˆ
,,
1
1
cc
RPc
WrRPvc hbj=  s.t. (5.4): 
  ( ))ˆ)(1('
)ˆ'
)'1()(1('
1
10
11
cRWru
cRWru
c
c
-++
÷÷ø
öççè
æ ---+
=- j
j
h    (A3.11) 
Since ()'u  is a decreasing function ( 0'' <u ), for 0>h we have: 
   1011 ˆˆ'
'1 cRWcRW cc -+>--- j
j      (A3.12) 
So, we get RWW cc >- )(' 01j  and PWW cc >-- ))('1( 01j  (A3.13). Replacing R  and 
P  with )(hcR  and )(hcP , and considering )(')0( 01 ccc WWR -= j  and 
))('1()0( 01 ccc WWP --= j , (A3.12) is equivalent with 0)0(',0)0(' << cc PR . The proof 
is now done. 
Proof of (ii): Quite similar to proof of (i). Maximizing (5.6) subject to (5.5), in stead of subject 
to (5.4), with regard to R  (and implicitly P ) and 1c , we have the first order condition, 
with regard to R , for some value of 1c  such that ),,,,',,(
~~maxargˆ
,,
1
1
cc
RPc
WrRPvc hbj=  
s.t. (5.5): 
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  ( ))ˆ)(1('
)ˆ'
)1)('1()(1('
1
10
11
cRWru
cRWru
c
c
-++
÷÷ø
öççè
æ ----+
= j
hj
   (A3.13) 
Then we have:  
)()(')1)('1(
'
01 hjhj
j ccc RWW =-+--  and )()(')1)('1(
)1)('1(
01 hjhj
hj ccc PWW =-+--
--   
(A3.14). Considering )(')0( 01 ccc WWR -= j  and ))('1()0( 01 ccc WWP --= j , (A3.14) 
implies 0)0(',0)0(' <> cc PR . The proof is now done. 
 
Proof of Proposition 6:  
Proof of (i): Parents’ associated indirect utility is given by (2.5a’’). Maximizing (2.5a’’) subject 
to (5.8) with regard to R  (and implicitly P ), we have the first order condition: 
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RAu p  (A3.15) 
Replacing R  with )(zR  as a function of z  in (A3.15), differentiating the equality with 
regard to z , and implementing the comparative statics immediately produce the following 
equation: 
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          (A3.16) 
Considering 0'>u , 0'' <u , clearly, R.H.S is positive, and the coefficient of )(' hR  in 
L.H.S is negative. So, replacing )(zR  with )(~ zpR , the proof is done. 
Proof of (ii): Parents’ associated indirect utility is given by (A2.5). Maximizing (2.5a’’) subject 
to (5.8) with regard to P  (and implicitly R ), we have the first order condition: 
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Replacing P  with )(zP  as a function of z  in (A3.17), differentiating the equality with 
regard to z , and implementing the comparative statics immediately produce the following 
equation: 
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         (A3.18) 
Considering 0'' <u , clearly, the coefficient of )(' hP  in L.H.S is negative. On the other 
hand, R.H.S can be rewritten as: 
 ( ) ( )( )CC+C-+= ''')1)(1(.. uurSHR jb    (A3.19) 
 where C º (1 + r)([j + (1 -j )(1- z)]/j)P(z )  
Considering the form of utility (2.1), the sign of R.H.S is positive, zero and negative, 
corresponding to 1<s , 1=s  and 1>s , respectively. So, replacing )(zP with )(~ zpP , 
the proof is done. 
 
Proof of Proposition 7:  
Proof of (i): Children’s associated indirect utility including default risk is given in (2.5b’). 
Maximizing (2.5b’) subject to (5.9) with regard to R  (and implicitly P ) and 1c , we have the 
first order condition, with regard to R , for some value of 1c  such that 
),,,',,(~maxargˆ
,,
1
1
cc
RPc
WrRPvc bj=  s.t. (5.9): 
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z    (A3.20) 
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Since ()'u  is a decreasing function ( 0'' <u ), for 0>h we have: 
   1011 ˆˆ)1('
)'1( cRWcRW cc -+>--
-- zj
j     (A3.21) 
So, we get RWW cc >--+-
- )()1(')'1(
)1('
01zjj
zj  (A3.22). L.H.S of (A3.22) is decreasing with 
regard toz . Replacing R  with )(~ zcR , and considering )(')0(~ 01 ccc WWR -= j , (A3.22) is 
equivalent with 0)0('~ <cR . The proof is now done. Unlike Proposition 5, the sign of )0('~ cP  
is still uncertain. 
 
 
